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Abstract
In this paper, we show that many semi-heuristic econometric formulas
can be derived from the natural symmetry requirements. The list of such
formulas includes many famous formulas provided by Nobel-prize winners,
such as Hurwicz optimism-pessimism criterion for decision making under
uncertainty, McFadden’s formula for probabilistic decision making, Nash’s
formula for bargaining solution – as well as Cobb-Douglas formula for
production, gravity model for trade, etc.

1

Why Symmetries

How do people make predictions? How do people make predictions? How
did people know that the Sun will rise in the morning? that a poisonous snake
can bite, and its bite can be deadly? Because in the past, the sun was always
rising; because in the past, snakes would sometimes bite, and the bitten person
would sometimes die.
In all these cases, to make a prediction, we look at similar situations in the
past – and make predictions based on what happened in such situations.
Some predictions are more complicated than that – they are based on using
formulas, equations, and physical laws. But how do we know that a formula –
e.g., Ohm’s law – is valid? Because in several previous similar situations, this
formula was true, so we conclude that this formula should be true now as well.
How to describe this idea in precise terms? The fact that the same
phenomenon is observed in several similar situations means, in eﬀect, that we
can make some changes in a situation, and the conclusion will remain the same.
For example, when we check Ohm’s law, we can move the laboratory – in
which we perform the measurements – to a diﬀerent location, we can rotate it,
we can increase it in size, we can change the value of the current, and after all
these changes, the formula remains the same – in other words, remains invariant.
1

Let us describe this invariance in precise terms. We have some phenomenon
p depending on the situation s. A generic change – such as shift or rotations –
means that we replace the original situation s by the changed situation T (s).
In these terms, invariance means that the phenomenon remains the same after
the change, i.e., that
p(T (s)) = p(s).
(1)
In physics, such invariance is called a symmetry. A particular case of an
invariance is when we have, e.g., a spherically symmetric object. If we rotate
this object, it will remain the same – this is exactly what symmetry means in
geometry.
Because of this example, physicists call each invariance symmetry.
Symmetries play a fundamental role in physics. Our above argument
seems to indicate that symmetries play a fundamental role in physics – and
indeed they do; see, e.g., [10, 42].
While on the past, new physical theories – such as Newton’s mechanics or
Maxwell’s electromagnetism – were formulated in terms of diﬀerential equations, nowadays theories are usually formulated in terms of their symmetries,
and equations can be derived from the requirement of invariance with respect to
these symmetries. Moreover, it turned out that even more traditional physical
equations, such as Newton’s or Maxwell’s, equations that were not originally
derived from symmetries, can actually be uniquely determined by the corresponding symmetries; see, e.g., [11, 12, 22, 24].
Comment. Similar symmetries can be used to explain many algorithms and
heuristics in computer science [37], including several heuristic formulas from
fuzzy logic, the empirical eﬃciency of diﬀerent activation functions in neural
networks, etc.
What about economics? The above arguments about predictions are not
limited to physical world: we make predictions about social events – e.g., economic predictions – the same way we make predictions in physics: we recall
similar situations in the past, and we predict that the same phenomenon will
occur now. In other words, predictions in economics are also, in essence, based
on invariance and symmetries.
So, the following natural question appears. As we have mentioned, in
physics, many empirical formulas, formulas that were originally derived based
on the observations, can often be derived from the basic symmetries. Can we
do the same with empirical-based econometric formulas? Can we derive them
from some basic symmetries?
Our answer to this question. Our answer to the above questions is “Yes,
we can!”. In this paper, we will show that many basic semi-heuristic economic
laws can actually be derived from the corresponding natural symmetries.
To explain how the economics laws can be thus derived, we ﬁrst need to
analyze which symmetries are natural in the economic context. In this analysis,
we will follow an analogy with physics.
2
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Which Symmetries Are Natural

Scaling: case of physics. Equations – like Ohm’s law stating that the voltage
V is equal to the product of the current I and the resistance R – deal with
numerical values of diﬀerent physical quantities. But these numerical values are
not absolute, they depend on the choice of the measuring unit.
For example, if instead of using Ampere (A) as a unit of current we use a
1000 times smaller unit milli-Ampere (mA), the actual current will not change,
but its numerical value will multiply by 1000. For example, instead of 2 A, we
will now have 1000 · 2 = 2000 mA.
In general, if we replace the original measuring unit with a unit which is λ
times smaller, then all the numerical values get multiplied by λ: instead of the
original value x, we now have a new value x′ = λ · x. Such a transformation
x → λ · x that multiplies each value x by the same constant λ is known as
scaling, and invariance with respect to scaling is known as scale-invariance.
What can we deduce from scale-invariance. Let us ﬁrst consider the
simplest case when we have a dependence of one quantity on the other y = f (x).
This is the case, e.g., if we ﬁx a conductor (and thus, ﬁx its resistance), and
we analyze how the voltage y measured between the two ends of this conductor
depends on the current x.
At ﬁrst glance, it may seem that invariance simply means that when we
replace x and λ · x, the value of y should not change:
f (λ · x) = f (x).

(2)

However, such a deﬁnition would lead to a constant function f (x) (at least a
function which is constant for x > 0): indeed, for every q > 0, by taking x = 1
and λ = q, we conclude, from the formula (2), that f (q) = f (1), i.e., that the
function f (x) is indeed a constant.
From the physical viewpoint, the reason for this strange result is clear: different measuring units are related. For example, if we change a unit of distance
from meters to feet, then, to preserve physical formulas, we also need to change
the unit of speed from m/sec to ft/sec. Similarly, if we change the unit of current, then, to preserve the formulas, we need to appropriately change the unit
for voltage. In general:
• if we change the unit of x to a λ times smaller one and thus change x
to x′ = λ · x,
• then we should according change the unit of y to a one which is C times
diﬀerent: y ′ = C · y, where this C depends on λ: C = C(λ),
• so that when y = f (x), then in the new units x′ and y ′ , we have the exact
same dependence y ′ = f (x′ ).
Substituting the above expressions for x′ and y ′ into the formula y ′ = f (x′ ), we
conclude that
f (λ · x) = C(λ) · f (x).
(3)
3

What can we deduce from this scale-invariance? For simplicity, let us assume
that the function f (x) is diﬀerentiable – this is a usual assumption in physics.
f (λ · x)
In this case, the function C(λ) =
is also diﬀerentiable – as a ratio of
f (x)
two diﬀerentiable functions. Thus, we can diﬀerentiate both side of equation (3)
df
with respect to λ and substitute λ = 1. As a result, we ﬁrst get x ·
(λ · x) =
dx
dC
(λ) · f (x), and then
dλ
df
(x) = c · f (x),
x·
dx
def

where we denoted c = C ′ (1). We can now separate the variables, i.e., move all
the terms containing x and dx to one side, and all the terms containing f and df
to another side. For that, we multiply both sides by dx and divide both sides by
df
dx
x and f , getting
= c · . Integrating both sides, we get ln(f ) = c · ln(x) + c0 ,
f
x
where c0 is an integration constant. Thus,
f = exp(ln(f )) = exp(c · ln(x) + c0 ) = exp(c · ln(x)) · exp(c0 ) =
A · (exp(ln(x))c = A · xc ,
def

where we denoted A = exp(c0 ).
So, scale-invariance implies the power law y = A · xc .
Comments.
• This result holds without assuming that the function f (x) is diﬀerentiable:
it is suﬃcient to assume that it is continuous (or even measurable); see,
e.g., [1].
• A similar result holds if we have a dependence on several variables, i.e.,
if we have a dependence y = f (x1 , . . . , xn ) which is scale-invariant in
the sense that for each values λ1 , . . . , λn , there exists a C such that if
y = f (x1 , . . . , xn ) then y ′ = f (x′1 , . . . , x′n ), where x′i = λi ·xi and y ′ = C ·y.
Such functions have the form y = A · xc11 · . . . · xcnn .
Scale-invariance is important in economics as well. Many quantities in
economics are scale-invariant: for example, the numerical values of income or of
the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) depends on what monetary units
we use. We can use the units of the corresponding country – e.g., Dong in the
case of Vietnam – or, if we want to compare salaries in diﬀerent countries, we
can use one of the universal currencies, e.g., US dollars.
The actual income in the same no matter what units we use, but numerical
values are, of course, diﬀerent. Similar to physics, in such cases, it makes sense to
require that the resulting formulas remain valid if we simply change a monetary
unit; of course, we may need to appropriately change related units as well.

4

Shift: case of physics. For some physical quantities, the numerical value also
depends on the starting point. For example, while we usually measure time by
using Year 0 as the starting point, many religious calendars – corresponding to
Buddhism, Islam, Judaism, etc. – use diﬀerent starting times.
Similarly, while the usual Celsius scale for temperature starts with the water
freezing point as 0, we an alternatively use the Kelvin scale, in which 0 is the
smallest possible temperature ≈ −273 C, or the Fahrenheit scale commonly
used in the US, in which 0 C corresponds to 32 F.
In general, if we replace the original starting point with a starting point
which is x0 times smaller or earlier, then all the numerical values are increase
by x0 : instead of the original value x, we now have a new value x′ = x+x0 . Such
a transformation x → x + x0 , that adds the same constant x0 to each value x, is
known as shift, and invariance with respect to shift is known as shift-invariance.
What can we deduce from shift-invariance. Let us ﬁrst consider the case
when we have a dependence of one quantity on the other y = f (x). In this case,
if we change the starting point for x, then, to preserve the formulas, we need to
appropriately change the unit for y:
• if we change x to x′ = x + x0 ,
• then we should according change the unit of y to a one which is C times
diﬀerent y ′ = C · y, where this C depends on x0 : C = C(x0 ),
• so that when y = f (x), then in the new units x′ and y ′ , we have the exact
same dependence y ′ = f (x′ ).
Substituting the above expressions for x′ and y ′ into the formula y ′ = f (x′ ), we
conclude that
f (x + x0 ) = C(x0 ) · f (x).
(4)
What can we deduce from this shift-invariance? Let us assume that the function
f (x + x0 )
f (x) is diﬀerentiable. In this case, the function C(x0 ) =
is also diff (x)
ferentiable – as a ratio of two diﬀerentiable functions. Thus, we can diﬀerentiate
both side of equation (4) with respect to x0 and substitute x0 = 0. As a result,
df
dC
we ﬁrst get
(x + x0 ) =
(x0 ) · f (x), and then
dx
dx0
df
= c · f,
dx
def

where we denoted c = C ′ (0).
We can now separate the variables, i.e., move all the terms containing x and
dx to one side, and all the terms containing f and df to another side. For that,
df
= c · dx.
we multiply both sides by dx and divide both sides by f , getting
f
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Integrating both sides, we get ln(f ) = c · x + c0 , where c0 is an integration
constant. Thus,
f = exp(ln(f )) = exp(c · x + c0 ) = A · exp(c · x),
def

where we denoted A = exp(c0 ).
So, shift-invariance implies the exponential dependence y = A · exp(c · x).
Comments.
• This result holds without assuming that the function f (x) is diﬀerentiable:
it is suﬃcient to assume that it is continuous (or measurable); see, e.g., [1].
• A similar result holds if we have a dependence on several variables, i.e.,
if we have a dependence y = f (x1 , . . . , xn ) which is shift-invariant in
the sense that for each values x01 , . . . , x0n , there exists a C such that
if y = f (x1 , . . . , xn ) then y ′ = f (x′1 , . . . , x′n ), where x′i = xi + x0i and
y ′ = C · y. Such functions have the form y = A · exp(c1 · x1 + . . . + cn · xn ).
Shift-invariance is important in economics as well. Many quantities in
economics are shift-invariant. For example, when we compute the income of
people living in countries with socialized medicine, we can compute this income
in two ways:
• we can simply take the income as is,
• or, if want a fair comparison with income in countries like US, where there
is no socialized medicine, we add the average cost of medical expenses to
the income.
Additivity. How can we estimate the force f (q) with which an electric ﬁeld acts
on a body of a known electric charge q? If this body consists of two components,
then there are two ways to do it:
• we can apply the formula f (q) to the body as a whole,
• or we can apply this formula to both components, with charges q ′ and
q ′′ , ﬁnd the forces f ′ = f (q ′ ) and f ′′ = f (q ′′ ) acting on each of the
components, and then add these forces into a single value f (q ′ ) + f (q ′′ ).
The second possibility come from the fact that both charges and forces are
additive in the sense that:
• the overall electric charge q of a two-component body in which two components have electric charges q ′ and q ′′ is equal to the sum of these two
charges, and
• the the overall force acting on a two-component body is equal to the sum
of the forces acting on each of the components.
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It is reasonable to require that the two estimates lead to the same number,
i.e., that
f (q ′ + q ′′ ) = f (q ′ ) + f (q ′′ ).
In general, we have functions that satisfy the following property for all x and y:
f (x + y) = f (x) + f (y).

(5)

Such functions are known as additive.
What can we deduce from additivity. Let us consider the case when we
have a dependence of one quantity on the other y = f (x). Let us assume that
the function f (x) is diﬀerentiable. In this case, we can diﬀerentiate both side
of equation (5) with respect to y and then substitute y = 0. As a result, we
df
df
df
def
ﬁrst get
(x + y) =
(y), and then
(x) = c, where we denoted c = f ′ (0).
dx
dy
dx
df
Integrating both sides of the formula
(x) = c, we get f (x) = c · x + c0 , where
dx
c0 is an integration constant.
For x = 0, the formula (5) takes the form f (0) = 2f (0), hence f (0) = 0.
Thus, c0 = 0, and f (x) = c · x.
So, additivity implies the linear dependence y = c · x.
Comments.
• This result holds without assuming that the function f (x) is diﬀerentiable:
it is suﬃcient to assume that it is continuous (or measurable); see, e.g., [1,
26].
• A similar result holds if we have a dependence on several variables, i.e.,
if we have a dependence y = f (x1 , . . . , xn ) which is additive in the sense
that for each values x′1 , x′′1 , . . . , x′n , x′n , if y ′ = f (x′1 , . . . , x′n ) and y ′′ =
f (x′′1 , . . . , x′′n ), then y = f (x1 , . . . , xn ), where xi = x′i + x′′i and y = y ′ + y ′′ .
Additivity is important in economics as well. Many quantities in economics are additive:
• the overall population of a country is equal to the sum of populations in
diﬀerent provinces,
• the overall GDP of a country is equal to the sum of GDPs of diﬀerent
provinces,
• the overall trade volume of a country is equal to the sum of the trade
volume of diﬀerent provinces, etc.
Thus, if we are interested in estimating the trade volume based on the GDP, we
can estimate this trade volume in two ways:
• we can plug in the overall GDP into the corresponding formula,
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• or we can use this formula to estimate the trade volume of each province,
and then add up the resulting estimates.
It is reasonable to require that these two estimates lead to the same result.
Summary. In this paper, we consider three types of natural symmetries:
• scale-invariance f (λ · x) = C(λ) · f (x) that leads to the power law:
f (x) = A · xc ;
• shift-invariance f (x + x0 ) = C(x0 ) · f (x) that leads to the exponential
dependence:
f (x) = A · exp(c · x);
• additivity f (x + y) = f (x) + f (y) that leads to the linear dependence:
f (x) = c · x.

3

How We (Should) Make Decisions: the Notion of Utility

Need to describe human preferences. In the previous section, we talked
about numerical economic quantities like population, GDP, income, etc. However, economy is driven by human preferences. So, to adequately describe economic processes, in addition to the above-mentioned numerical characteristics,
we must also describe human preferences. How can we do it?
How can we describe human preferences? A natural way to describe
human preferences is as follows; see, e.g., [13, 23, 29, 35, 40]. We select two
extreme alternatives:
• a very bad alternative A− which is worse than any of the actual options,
and
• a very good alternative A+ which is better than any of the actual options.
Then, for each value p from the interval [0, 1], we can form a lottery L(p) in
which we get A+ with probability p and A− with the remaining probability
1 − p. When p = 0, the lottery L(0) is simply equivalent to A− . The larger p,
the better the alternative. Finally, when p = 1, we get A(1) = L+ .
Thus, we get a continuous scale for describing preferences. For each realistic
alternative A, it is better than L(0) = A− and worse than L(1) = A+ : L(0) <
A < L(1). Of course, if L(p) < A and p′ < p, then L(p′ ) < A. Similarly, if
A < L(p) and p < p′ , then A < L(p′ ). Thus, one can show that there exists a
threshold value u such that:
• for p < u, we have L(p) < A, and
8

• for p > u, we have A < L(p).
For example, we can take u = sup{p : L(p) < A}. This value u is called the
utility of the given alternative A and is denoted by u(A).
We can reformulate the threshold statement by saying that the alternative
A is equivalent to the lottery L(u), where the equivalent has to be understood
in the above threshold sense, i.e., equivalently, that L(u − ε) < A < L(u + ε)
for all ε > 0. In this sense, the utility u(A) can be deﬁned as a probability u
for which the alternative A is equivalent to the lottery L(u).
What if we select a diﬀerent pair A− and A+ ? The numerical value u(A)
of utility obtained by the above construction depends on the choice of A− and
A+ . If we select another pair A′− and A′+ , then, for the same alternative, we will
get a diﬀerent utility value u′ (A). What is the relation between u(A) and u′ (A)?
To answer this question, let us consider the case when A′− < A− < A+ < A′+
– other cases can be treated similarly. In this case, since A− and A+ are between
A′− and A′+ , we can ﬁnd a utility u′ (A− ) and u′ (A+ ) of each of them with respect
to the pair (A′− , A′+ ). Then:
• A− is equivalent to a (A′− , A′+ )-lottery L′ (u′ (A− )), in which we get A′+
with probability u′ (A− ) and A′− with the remaining probability 1−u′ (A− ),
and
′
• A+ is equivalent to a (A−
, A′+ )-lottery L′ (u′ (A+ )), in which we get A′+
′
with probability u (A+ ) and A′− with the remaining probability 1−u′ (A+ ).

Each alternative A with utility u(A) is, by deﬁnition of utility, equivalent to
a lottery L(u(A)) in which we get A+ with probability u(A) and A− with
probability 1 − u(A). Each of the alternatives A− and A+ is, as we have just
mentioned, itself equivalent to a lottery. Thus, the original alternative A is
equivalent to a complex lottery, in which:
• ﬁrst, we select A+ with probability u(A) and A− with the probability
1 − u(A), and then,
• depending on what we selected on the ﬁrst step, we select A′+ with probability u′ (A+ ) or u′ (A− ) and we select A′− with the remaining probability.
As a result of this complex lottery, we always get either A′− or A′+ . The probability to get A′+ can be computed by adding probabilities corresponding to two
diﬀerent ways of getting A′+ : it is u(A) · u′ (A+ ) + (1 − u(A)) · u′ (A− ). But
by deﬁnition of a (A′− , A′+ )-based utility, this probability is exactly the utility
u′ (A). Thus,
u′ (A) = u(A) · u′ (A+ ) + (1 − u(A)) · u′ (A− ) =
u′ (A− ) + u(A) · (u′ (A+ ) − u′ (Ai )).
Thus, the transformation from the old utility u(A) to the new utility u′ (A) follows the same formulas as when we change the starting point and the measuring
unit:
9

• u′ (A− ) plays the role of shift x0 , and
• the diﬀerence u′ (A+ ) − u′ (A− ) plays the role of the scaling λ.
So, to analyze the formulas involving utility, we can also use concepts of scaleand shift-invariance.

4

How Utility Depends on Money

Utility u is not proportional to money m. It is an empirical fact that utility
is not proportional to money. Intuitively, this is easy to understand: when a
person has nothing, adding $10 feels great, but when this person already has
$1000, adding $10 does not change much.
So, how is utility depending on money?
Natural starting point. In general, as have mentioned, utilities are deﬁned
modulo an arbitrary linear transformation, so we can shift them and/or scale
them.
For money, there is a natural starting point corresponding to 0 amount, i.e.,
corresponding to the case when we have no savings and no debts. Without
losing generality, let us select a utility function for which this 0-money situation
corresponds to 0 utility. Once the starting point is thus ﬁxed, the only remaining
utility transformation is scaling u → k · u.
So what is the dependence of u(m)? As we have mentioned earlier, the
numerical value describing the amount of money depends on the choice of the
monetary unit. It is therefore reasonable to require that the formula u(m)
describing the dependence of utility u on money m does not change if we simply
change the monetary unit.
In precise terms, this means that if select a diﬀerent monetary unit, i.e., if
we consider new numerical values m′ = λ · m, then we will get the exact same
dependence u′ (m′ ) of utility of money, probably after appropriately re-scaling
the utility into u′ = C · u. We already know that this scale-invariance leads
to the power law u = A · mc – and this is exactly what was experimentally
observed, with c ≈ 0.5 – see, e.g. [17, 28].

5

Probabilistic Choice

Formulation of the problem. The traditional utility-based decision theory
assumes that, when faced several times with the same several alternatives, the
person would make the same selection. In reality, if we repeatedly oﬀer the
same choice to a person, this person will, in general, select diﬀerent alternatives
in diﬀerent iterations. Speciﬁcally, alternatives with low utility will practically
never be selected, the alternative with the largest utility value will be selected
most frequently, but alternatives whose utility is close to the largest will also be
selected sometimes.
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In such situations, all we can try to predict is the frequency (probability)
with which each alternative is selected.
Analysis of the problem. As we have mentioned, the larger the utility of an
alternative a, the higher the probability that this alternative will be selected.
Thus, we can say that the probability p(a) of selecting the alternative a is
proportional to some monotonic function f (u) of its utility: p(a) = C · f (u(a)).
The coeﬃcient of proportionality C can be determined from the condition that
one of the alternatives is always selected,
and thus,
∑
∑ the sum of the selections
probabilities should be equal to 1:
p(b) = C · f (u(b)) = 1, hence
b

C=∑

b

1
f (u(a))
, and p(a) = ∑
.
f (u(b))
f (u(b))

b

b

In these terms, the question is: which monotonic function f (u) should we
choose?
Let us apply natural symmetries. As we have mentioned, utility is deﬁned
modulo an arbitrary shift u → u′ = u + u0 . It is reasonable to select the
monotonic function f (u) in such a way that the resulting probabilities do not
change if we apply such a shift, i.e., if we replace each value u(a) by a shifted
value u′ (a) = u(a) + u0 .
The original probability is proportional to f (u), the shifted one is proportional to f (u + u0 ). So, we conclude that the shifted function f (u + u0 ) must
be proportional to the original one f (u), i.e., that we should have f (u + u0 ) =
C(u0 ) · f (u) for some proportionality coeﬃcient C(u0 ).
We already know that this functional equation leads to f (u) = A · exp(c0 · u)
exp(c0 · u(a))
for some c0 , and thus, to p(a) = ∑
[21]. This is exactly the
exp(c0 · u(b))
b

formula for which D. McFadden received his Nobel Prize in 2011; see, e.g., [32,
33, 44].
Comment. As we have mentioned earlier, utility is determined not only modulo
shift, it is also determined modulo an arbitrary scaling u → u′ = k · u. Clearly,
McFadden’s formula is not invariant with respect to scalings. What if instead
of shift-invariance we require scale-invariance?
In other words, what if we require that the probabilities p(a) do not change
if we replace each utility u(a) with a re-scaled one u′ (a) = k · u(a)? Similarly to
the shift-invariance case, this requirement implies that f (k · u) = C(k) · f (u) for
some C(k), and we know that this leads to f (u) = A · uc for some c and thus,
(u(a))c
[21]. This explains the empirical formula described in [16].
to p(a) = ∑
(u(b))c
b
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6

Decision Making under Interval Uncertainty

Formulation of the problem. If we know the exact utility value u(a) corresponding to each possible action a, then it is reasonable to select the action
that leads to the largest possible value of utility.
However, in many practical situations, we do not know the exact consequences of each possible action and therefore, we cannot determine the exact
utility value of each action. At best, for each possible action a, we know the
bounds on the utility, i.e., we know the interval [u(a), u(a)] that contains the
actual (unknown) utility value. In such situations of interval uncertainty, how
should we make a decision?
Analysis of the problem. The simplest case of the above problem is when:
• we have two alternatives;
• for the ﬁrst alternative, we know the interval [u, u]; and
• for the second alternative, we know the exact utility value u.
Let is ﬁx u and u and consider diﬀerent possible values u.
When the value u is small (e.g., when u < u), the ﬁrst alternative is clearly
better. When the value u is large (e.g., when u < u), the second alternative is
clearly better. Thus, similarly to the deﬁnition of utility, there exists a threshold
value u0 (u, u) such that:
• when u < u0 , the ﬁrst alternative is better, and
• when u0 < u, the second alternative is better.
In this sense, the interval [u, u] is equivalent to the threshold value u0 .
Thus, in general, to compare two or more intervals:
• we compute, for each of these intervals [u(a), u(a)], the corresponding
equivalent value u0 (u(a), u(a)), and then
• we select the action a for which this equivalent value is the largest.
So, the remaining problem is how to ﬁnd the equivalent value u0 (u, u).
Let us use symmetries. As we have mentioned, utility is deﬁned modulo shifts
and scalings. It is therefore reasonable to require that the relation u = u0 (u, u)
does not change under such transformations, i.e., that:
• this relation be shift-invariant: if u0 (u, u) = u, then for each possible shift
∆u, we have u0 (u + ∆u, u + ∆u) = u + ∆u; and
• this relation be scale-invariant: if u0 (u, u) = u, then for each possible
scaling k > 0, we have u0 (k · u, k · u) = k · u.
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Let us denote, by αH , a utility value u0 (0, 1) which is equivalent to the
simplest possible interval [0, 1]. Clearly, since all the possible values from this
interval are greater than or equal to 0, the equivalent value should also be
better than or equivalent to 0, i.e., we should have αH ≥ 0. Similarly, we
should have αH ≤ 1.
For each pair of values u < u, due to scale-invariance with k = u − u, the
equation u0 (0, 1) = αH implies that u0 (0, u − u) = (u − u) · αH . Then, shiftinvariance with ∆u = u implies that u0 (u, u) = u + (u − u) · αH . The right-hand
side of this formula can be rewritten as
u0 (u, u) = αH · u + (1 − αH ) · u;
see, e.g., [23]. This is exactly the formula for decision making under interval
uncertainty for which Leo Hurwicz received his Nobel prize [15, 29]. Thus,
Hurwicz’s formula can be derived from natural symmetries.
Comment. Hurwicz’s formula is known as the optimism-pessimism criterion,
for the following reason:
• if αH = 1, this means that the person only takes into account the best
possible scenario when making a decision; in other words, this person is a
complete optimist;
• if αH = 0, this means that the person only takes into account the worst
possible scenario when making a decision; in other words, this person is a
complete pessimist;
• intermediate values αH between 0 and 1 mean that the person take into
account both best-case and worst-case scenarios.

7

Taking Future Eﬀects into Account When Making a Decision

Formulation of the problem. When making economic decisions, people
naturally value future gains as less beneﬁcial that current ones. An option is
which a person gets $1 at time t is clearly worth less that a dollar now. This
makes sense, since if we get a dollar now, we can invest it – e.g., deposit it in a
savings account – and thus, get a larger amount by time t. This phenomenon
is known as discounting.
How to take this phenomenon into account? In other words, what is the
price D(t) that a person should be willing to pay for the option of getting $1 at
moment t?
Analysis of the problem. To estimate D(t), let us use shift-invariance.
Speciﬁcally, for any pair of values t and t0 , the quality D(t + t0 ) can be estimated in two diﬀerent ways:
• we can directly estimate the desired quantity as D(t + t0 );
13

• alternatively, we can take into account that $1 at moment t + t0 (which
is t periods after the moment t0 ) is equivalent to D(t) dollars at moment
t0 ; each dollar at moment t0 is equivalent to D(t0 ) dollars now; thus, D(t)
dollars at moment t0 are equivalent to D(t0 ) · D(t) dollars now.
It is reasonable to require that these two estimates coincide, i.e., that
D(t + t0 ) = D(t0 ) · D(t).
This formula is a particular case of the general shift-invariance, so we conclude that D(t) = A·exp(c·t) for some A and c. Substituting this expression into
the above formula, we conclude that A = 1 and thus, D(t) = exp(c·t). This is exactly the usual formula for discounting; see, e.g., [8, 14, 18, 19, 20, 30, 31, 39, 46].
Thus, the usual formula for discounting can be derived from natural symmetries.
Comment. In [46], we showed that symmetries can also be used to explain
the empirically observed deviations from the usual discounting formula; see
[8, 14, 18, 19, 20, 30, 31, 39] for details on these deviations.

8

Group Decision Making

Formulation of the problem. What if a group of people needs to make a
joint decision?
To properly answer this question, we also need to take into account that
the group may be unable to come to an agreement. The resulting situation is
known as the status quo situation.
Analysis of the problem. We can always shift each individual utility so that
for the status quo solution, the utility of each participant is 0.
Once this status quo point is ﬁxed, the only possible symmetries are scalings
ui → u′i = ki · ui . It is reasonable to require that the decision criterion does not
change under this scaling.
A reasonable idea is to have an objective function that combines n utilities
u1 , . . . , un into a single utility value u = f (u1 , . . . , un ). As we have analyzed
earlier, in this case, scale-invariance implies that f (u1 , . . . , xn ) = A·uc11 ·. . .·ucnn .
It is also reasonable to require that all there is no prior preference to any
of the participants. In precise terms, this means that the decision should not
change if we simply rename the participants. With respect to the above objective function, this means that all the coeﬃcients ci must coincide, so that
f (u1 , . . . , un ) = A · (u1 · . . . · un )c .
Maximizing this function is equivalent to maximizing the product
u1 · . . . · un ;
[25]. This is exactly the bargaining solution proposed by nobelist John Nash [34,
29]. Thus, Nash’s solution can also be derived from symmetries.
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9

Cobb-Douglas Production Function

Formulation of the problem. If we know the country’s overall capital K
and overall labor input L, how can we estimate the country’s production Y ? In
other words, what function f (K, L) should we use to estimate Y ?
Analysis of the problem. The numerical values of all these quantities –
capital, labor, and production – depend on what units we use to measure them.
It is therefore reasonable to require that the corresponding model Y ≈ f (K, L)
does not change if we simply change the corresponding units. In other words,
it is reasonable to require that the dependence f (K, L) be scale-invariant.
We already know that scale-invariance implies that Y = A·K α ·Lβ , for some
α and β. This is exactly the well-known Cobb-Douglas production function;
see, e.g., [7, 45, 26]. Thus, the Cobb-Douglas formula can also be derived from
natural symmetries.

10

Gravity Model for Trade

Formulation of the problem. How can we estimate the volume of trade tij
between the two countries i and j? Clearly, the larger each country’s GDPs
gi and gj , the more trade we can expect. Similarly, the smaller the distance
rij between the two countries, the more trade we expect. What will be a good
estimate for tij as a function of gi , gj , and rij : tij = f (gi , gj , rij )?
Analysis of the problem. As we have mentioned earlier, we can apply this
formula to countries as a whole or to diﬀerent regions of these countries – and
then add up the resulting trade volumes. It is reasonable to require that the
resulting estimate for the trade volume should not depend on whether we consider the country as a whole or its regions. This means that the dependence
on gi should be additive: f (gi′ + gi′′ , gj , rij ) = f (gi′ , gj , rij ) + f (gi′′ , gj , rij ). As
we have shown, this requirement implies that the function f should be linear in
gi : f (gi , gj , rij ) = gi · F (gj , rij ), for some coeﬃcient F (gj , rij ) depending on gj
and rij .
Similarly, we can consider the country j as a whole or as a combination of
its regions. A similar additivity requirement enables us to conclude that the
trade volume should be linear in gj as well, so f (gi , gj , rij ) = gi · gj · H(rij ) for
some function H(r).
To ﬁnd the function H(r), it is reasonable to take into account that the
distance can be measured in diﬀerent units, and the formula for the trade should
not change whether we use kilometers or miles. The resulting scale-invariance
implies that H(r) = A · rc for some A and c. Thus, we arrive at the following
c
formula for the trade volume between the two countries: tij = A · gi · gj · rij
[27].
This is exactly the well-known gravity model; see, e.g., [2, 3, 5, 38, 43]. Thus,
the gravity model can indeed be derived from natural symmetries.
Comment. The usual gravity model only takes into account the GDPs gi and
gj of the two countries. What if we also take into account their populations pi
15

and pj ? In this case, additivity implies that tij is linear in gi and pi , and it is
also linear in gj and pj . Thus, the overall dependence is bilinear, i.e., we get
the following more complex (and hopefully, more accurate) estimate [27]:
tij =

11

Ggg · gi · gj + Ggp · gi · pj + Gpg · pi · gj + Gpp · pi · pj
.
c
rij

Linear ARMAX-GARCH Models

Formulation of the problem. How can we predict the future value Xt of
an economic quantity X based on its previous values Xt−1 , Xt−2 , . . . , and
on the values dt , dt−1 , . . . , of an external quantity d that aﬀects X? In other
words, which function f (Xt−1 , Xt−2 , . . . , dt , dt−1 , . . .) provides the best estimate
for Xt ?
Analysis of the problem. In many cases, the quantities X in which we are
interested are additive – like GDP. Similarly, the quantities d that aﬀect X are
usually additive – e.g., the amount of foreign direct investment. In such cases,
it is reasonable to require that the prediction should not depend on whether we
consider the country as a whole or as a combination of several inputs, i.e., to
require that
′
′′
′
′′
f (Xt−1
+ Xt−1
, Xt−2
+ Xt−2
, . . . , d′t + d′′t , d′t−1 + d′′t−1 , . . .) =
′′
′′
′
′
, . . . , d′′t , d′′t−1 , . . .).
, Xt−2
, . . . , d′t , d′t−1 , . . .) + f (Xt−1
, Xt−2
f (Xt−1

We know that this additivity requirement implies that the function f is linear,
i.e., that
p
b
∑
∑
Xt ≈
φi · Xt−i +
ηi · dt−i ,
i=1

i=1

for appropriate coeﬃcients φi and ηi .
To get an even more accurate prediction, it is desirable to take into account
how accurately this model predicted the past values of Xt , i.e., what were the
diﬀerences εt−1 , εt−2 , . . . , between the actual values and the predictions. For
additive quantities and linear models, the diﬀerences are also additive, so we
get a more accurate linear model
Xt ≈

p
∑

φi · Xt−i +

i=1

b
∑
i=1

ηi · dt−i +

q
∑

θi · εt−i ,

i=1

for some θi .
Taking into account that the inaccuracy of this model is exactly what we
denoted by εt , we this conclude that
Xt =

p
∑
i=1

φi · Xt−i +

b
∑

ηi · dt−i + εt +

i=1

q
∑
i=1
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θi · εt−i ;

see, e.g., [36].
This is exactly the AutoRegressive-Moving-Average model with eXogenous
inputs (ARMAX) [6, 9]. Thus, this model can indeed be justiﬁed by the corresponding symmetries.
Comment. If we denote the standard deviation of εt by σt , then similar arguments – based on the fact that for independent random variables, variance σt2
is additive – show that the dynamics of standard deviations σt is described by
a linear formula
ℓ
k
∑
∑
2
σt2 = α0 +
βi · σt−i
+
αi · ε2t−i ;
i=1

i=1

see, e.g., [36]. This is exactly the Generalized AutoRegressive Conditional Heterosckedasticity (GARCH) model [4, 6, 9]. Thus, GARCH formulas also follow
from the natural symmetries.
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